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Abstract 
Control of skilled actions requires rapid information sampling and processing, which may largely be carried 
out subconsciously. However, individuals often need to make conscious strategic decisions that ideally 
would be based upon accurate knowledge of performance. Here we determined the extent to which 
individuals have explicit awareness of their steering performance (conceptualised as ‘metacognition’). 
Participants steered in a virtual environment along a bending road whilst attempting to keep within a central 
demarcated target zone. Task demands were altered by manipulating locomotor speed (fast/slow) and the 
target zone (narrow/wide). All participants received continuous visual feedback about position in zone, and 
one sub-group were given additional auditory warnings when exiting/entering the zone. At the end of each 
trial participants made a metacognitive evaluation: the proportion of the trial they believed was spent in the 
zone. Overall, whilst evaluations broadly shifted in line with task demands, participants showed limited 
calibration to performance. Regression analysis showed that evaluations were influenced by two 
components: i) direct monitoring of performance, and ii) indirect task heuristics estimating performance 
based on salient cues (e.g. speed). Evaluations often weighted indirect task heuristics inappropriately, but 
the additional auditory feedback improved evaluations seemingly by reducing this weighting. These results 
have important implications for all motor tasks where conscious cognitive control can be used to influence 
action selection. 
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Introduction 
Locomotor control is a ubiquitous human behaviour that 
is essential for successful interactions with the world, 
moving through space to achieve a goal. Whilst many of 
the underlying locomotor behaviours that support slow-
paced walking also ‘scale up’ to faster modes of transport 
(e.g. cycling), when driving a vehicle on a road there are a 
host of new behaviours that need to be learnt in order to be 
successful (changing gears, navigating at high speeds, 
interacting with vulnerable road users, monitoring road 
rules, using mirrors etc.). Consequently, driving is one of 
the most risky perceptual-motor tasks that humans carry 
out routinely, yet there is limited understanding of the 
cognitive mechanisms that support this task.  
Driving can been conceptualised as a hierarchical 
task (cf. Michon, 1985; McRuer & Allen, 1977), where the 
execution of the ‘low-level’ perceptual-motor behaviours 
(that move the human along the desired trajectory) are 
supervised by guidance systems that are responsible for 
making ‘higher-level’ trajectory planning decisions (such 
as when to overtake or how tightly to cut a corner). The 
basic principles underlying steering control are fairly well 
established, with the human central-nervous system 
coordinating fast perceptual-motor feedback loops to 
correct immediate errors, combined with the use of 
prospective ‘future path’ information to guide steering 1-
2s ahead (Land & Lee, 1994; Land & Horwood, 1995; 
Salvucci & Gray, 2004; Wilkie et al., 2008; Frissen & 
Mars, 2014; Mole et al., 2016; Lappi, 2014). One of the 
critical properties of successful steering control is the rapid 
production of appropriate actions. For this reason, the 
interactions between steering responses and slower 
‘cognitive’ processes (e.g. memory) are likely to be 
limited. When driving, however, locomotor scenarios tend 
to be more complex than simply steering a bend, and there 
are cognitively penetrable strategic decisions influencing 
the initiation (e.g. deciding to pull out at a junction) or 
maintenance (e.g. braking or steering to avoid a crash) of 
certain actions.  Such decision-making requires accurate 
self-assessment of competence to avoid an individual 
placing themselves in a situation where the task demands 
exceed their capabilities (Sundström, 2011).  
The extent to which drivers have accurate 
knowledge of their perceptual-motor performance is 
currently unclear. In terms of crude self-assessments of 
skill level, the driving population is notorious for 
overestimation, with the majority considering themselves 
“better-than-average” drivers (Svenson, 1981; 
Goszcynska & Roslan, 1989; see Kovácsová et al., 2016 
for a replication of this effect in cyclists). Such inflated 
self-assessment has been linked to an increase in accidents 
in novice drivers (Gregersen, 1996), as well as to ratings 
of unsafe driving behaviour (Freund, Colgrove, Burke, & 
Mcleod, 2005; Amado, Arikan, Kaça, Koyuncu, & 
Turkan, 2014). It has been pointed out, however, that 
asking drivers to estimate their general driving skill may 
not actually assess their ‘awareness of performance’ 
(Sundström, 2008) since above-average social 
comparisons appears to apply to many human judgements 
of ability (Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Sharot, 2011; 
Simons, 2013), especially when information about the trait 
or aspect of skill being compared is uncertain (Dunning et 
al., 1989). Instead, it has been proposed that awareness of 
driver performance should be assessed by asking 
participants to make judgements of performance on a 
quantifiable driving task (Sundstrom, 2008), and there is 
some evidence that self-evaluations can be improved if the 
evaluation criterion is specific (Amado et al., 2014). 
Consequently, there have been attempts in the Traffic 
Psychology literature to examine driver calibration – the 
degree of alignment between subjective assessment of 
performance and objective performance measures 
(Horrey, Lesch, Mitsopoulos-Rubens, & Lee, 2015). 
When the driving task is quantifiable (such as quantity of 
traffic cones hit), Roberts et al. (2016) found that ratings 
of performance can be fairly well-calibrated to actual 
performance. 
These methods are useful to assess general self-
perceptions of performing well (or not so well), which may 
feed into conscious preparatory decisions regarding 
driving risk and capability, for example deciding whether 
to drive at night (Fuller, 2005). Moment-to-moment 
trajectory planning decisions, however, presumably 
require precise information about ‘on-line’ perceptual-
motor performance in order to appropriately guide steering 
control (McRuer et al., 1977). However, the extent to 
which humans can accurately monitor perceptual-motor 
performance is unclear. Mamassian (2008) demonstrated 
that people have limited knowledge about motor 
performance variability, leading to sub-optimal, 
overconfident, motor decisions in a timing task. There is 
also evidence that some aspects of perceptual-motor 
behaviour are largely automatic (and unconscious) with 
individuals seemingly able to correct errors without being 
explicitly aware of making the corrections or even that 
corrections were needed (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; 
Sinanaj, Cojan, & Vuilleumier, 2015; Prablanc & Martin, 
1992; Pelisson et al., 1986).  
A useful framework for examining awareness of 
performance is metacognition. The ability to successfully 
monitor cognitive processes has been demonstrated in 
various domains, from memory (see Dunlosky & Bjork, 
2008), to (visual) perceptual decisions (e.g. Fleming et al., 
2015; Peters & Lau, 2015) and action-control monitoring 
(i.e. sense of agency or feeling in control of one’s actions, 
e.g. Sidarus & Haggard, 2016; Metcalfe, Eich & Miele, 
2013). Metacognition is linked to the control of behaviour 
(Nelson & Narens, 1990) in that metacognitive monitoring 
has behavioural consequences. For example, when 
participants make metacognitive judgments about how 
well they have learned new information (word pairs), this 
has direct influence on what items they choose to restudy 
before a final memory test, even in situations where these 
judgments do not accurately reflect how well the 
information has been learned (Metcalfe & Finn, 2008). 
Understanding how monitoring judgments are constructed 
is therefore one of the key questions in the metacognitive 
literature and it is particularly relevant for judgments made 
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during high-speed locomotion, where there is greater risk 
of poor judgements leading to harmful errors (Freund et 
al., 2005).  
The prevailing framework for capturing 
metacognitive function stipulates two main levels (Nelson 
& Narens, 1990): an object-level (task performance) 
which is monitored and controlled by a meta-level 
(performance awareness). This two-level metacognition 
framework (Nelson & Narens, 1990) has pleasing parallels 
with the guiding level and execution level proposed in 
driving (McRuer et al., 1977), but to date there has been 
limited research into metacognitive awareness of 
perceptual-motor behaviour (but see Mamassian, 2008). In 
the domain of motor learning (where novices are taught 
new motor skills) it has been shown that errors in 
monitoring can occur, with individuals exhibiting flawed 
knowledge of how well they have learnt a motor skill 
(Simon & Bjork, 2001; Abushanab & Bishare, 2013), or 
lacking insight into the optimum strategy with which to 
learn that skill (Simon & Bjork, 2002; see Soderstrom & 
Bjork, 2015 for a review). Once the skill is learnt, motor 
performance will still require monitoring to ensure 
changes in performance are not invalidating strategic level 
decisions. It remains to be demonstrated whether drivers 
have good metacognitive awareness of perceptual-motor 
steering performance.  
Metacognition is primarily viewed as an 
inferential process (Koriat, 2000) which relies on cues 
derived from the task at hand to construct judgments about 
performance. An example of a task related cue that has 
been shown to influence metacognitive judgments in a 
range of tasks is processing fluency of the monitored 
stimulus (e.g. Rhodes & Castel, 2008; Sidarus & Haggard, 
2016). While the cues that influence metacognitive 
judgments can be related to task performance (e.g. Koriat, 
2008), in some instances participants fail to act on 
performance-relevant information (Koriat & Bjork, 2005) 
or, alternatively, they base their monitoring judgments on 
irrelevant information that does not relate to task 
performance (e.g. Rhodes & Castel, 2008).  
A similar cue-based approach has been proposed 
as a conceptual framework for assessing driver calibration 
(Horrey et al., 2015). Good calibration arises from 
selecting perceptual cues that capture task performance, 
whereas miscalibration can result from selecting 
inappropriate cues or failing to weight cues appropriately 
(Horrey et al., 2015). However, given the evidence that 
specific perceptual-motor tasks are executed with limited 
cognitive penetrability (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; 
Sinanaj, Cojan, & Vuilleumier, 2015; Prablanc & Martin, 
1992; Pelisson et al., 1986), it remains unclear whether 
                                                 
1 Post-trial knowledge of results could have been 
an alternative method to provide feedback, but it seems to 
have mixed effects on performance monitoring (Carter, 
Smith, & Ste-Marie, 2016; Roberts et al., 2016) and is a 
relatively artificial way of providing feedback for trials of 
this duration (i.e. drivers do not routinely experience 
explicit knowledge of results in the real-world except for 
drivers are able to select and appropriately weight 
perceptual cues when making judgements of performance. 
Furthermore, Roberts et al. (2016) found that the provision 
of feedback did little to improve calibration, suggesting 
that drivers may have difficulty using additional feedback 
to re-weight cues. The literature that examines judgements 
of performance in driving has tended to use real-world 
settings (e.g. Amado et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2016). 
However, in the real-world it is difficult to control the cues 
available to drivers, or even to measure the feedback that 
was available whilst moving through the scene. This 
makes it difficult to determine how judgements were 
generated, and which sources of information judgements 
were actually based upon.  
To attempt to address these issues we used a 
computer simulated virtual driving environment in order 
to examine metacognitive judgements using a highly 
controlled steering task where the parameters influencing 
performance are specific and explicit, allowing direct 
comparisons between judgements and performance across 
different task conditions. The current experiment sets out 
to investigate i) whether individuals could accurately 
monitor performance on a specific perceptual-motor task 
across conditions of varying difficulty, ii) which task-
relevant cues informed judgements, iii) whether 
judgements are altered with available feedback.  
 Individuals were required to steer along a 
bending road and were asked to keep within a sub-region 
- a central, delineated, target zone (which was narrower 
than the road itself). Two task parameters were varied: 
speed of travel, and the width of the target zone. Faster 
speeds and narrower zones effectively increased task 
difficulty (and so should impair performance), ensuring 
that there was variation in performance across conditions. 
After each trial participants made a judgement of what 
proportion of the trial they spent within the required zone, 
and then determined how well judgements reflected the 
performance. 
In order to investigate whether quality of 
feedback could improve judgments, we split participants 
into two groups. The first group received the standard 
continuous visual feedback provided by the visible scene 
(i.e. position in lane). The second group received the same 
visual feedback, as well as additional auditory feedback in 
the form of a short auditory tone whenever they entered or 
exited the target zone. The auditory feedback was 
temporally compatible with the near portion of the zone, 
which can be used for monitoring lateral road position 
(Salvucci & Gray, 2004; Mole et al., 2016), therefore 
should serve to increase the salience of task-relevant road 
position1.  
the occasional major error such as a crash/collision). In 
contrast, drivers routinely incorporate multi-sensory 
signals into lane-keeping (such as the haptic feel of the 
steering wheel, or the sound caused by the vibration of the 
tyres passing across lane markings or rumble strips). 
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Method 
Participants 
64 participants (34 females, 30 males; aged 17 to 52, mean 
= 24.95 yrs, std = 7.74) took part in the study, split into 
two groups of 32. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. 58 participants had full driving licenses 
(average number of years since test = 6.94 yrs) and the 
remaining six participants had relevant experience (in the 
form of driving lessons or go-karting) All participants 
gave informed consent and the study was approved by the 
University of Leeds Ethical Committee, and complied 
with all guidelines as set out in the declaration of Helsinki.  
Apparatus 
The experiment used a PC (Intel i7 950 3.07 GHz) with an 
update rate of 60Hz. The stimuli were programmed using 
WorldViz Vizard 3.0 and were back-projected (PLC-
XU58) onto a 1.98m x 1.43m screen (as per Mole et al., 
2016). Participants were sat in a darkened matt-black 
viewing booth, in a height-adjustable racing-style driving 
seat with an eye position 1m away from the screen and 
1.2m from the ground, so the total visual angle of the 
display was 89.42° x 71.31°. A force-feedback wheel 
(Logitech G27) was used to control steering.  
Stimuli 
The visual stimulus consisted of a tessellated gravel 
texture applied to the ground-plane, with two 
superimposed white lines that acted as road edges, and a 
road sub-region marked by two green lines that acted as 
the target steering zone (see Figure 1A). Similar to 
previous studies (Kountouriotis, Floyd, Gardner, Merat, & 
Wilkie, 2012; Mole et al., 2016) the curvature and width 
of the road (white lines) were kept constant throughout 
conditions (3m wide, 60m radius). The first 9m of each 
road consisted of a straight part followed by a constant 
curvature bend. The driver started in the centre of the road 
in every trial. In half the trials the target zone (green lines) 
was 0.3m wide (10% of road width; “Narrow” conditions), 
in the other half the trials were 0.5m wide (16.7% of road 
width; “Wide” conditions). The speed of locomotion was 
constant within each trial; in half of the trials it was set at 
12 m/s (26.84mph; “Slow” conditions) and in half of the 
trials it was set at 18 m/s (40.26mph; “Fast” conditions).  
The difference between participant groups was 
the presence/absence of auditory feedback linked to road 
position. One group received just visual feedback (VF) and 
no additional auditory feedback. The second group 
                                                 
 
received both auditory and visual feedback (AVF) - 
whenever the driver crossed the green lines denoting the 
target zone a short beep [240Hz tone] was sounded for .1s. 
Thus these participants received auditory feedback 
whenever they entered or exited the zone.  
When a typical adult steers round a bend, eye-
movements are directed towards the future path, with near-
road information mostly sampled via peripheral vision 
(Wilkie et al., 2008).  The monitoring task (described 
below) required near-road positional information, we 
therefore anticipated that participants would direct gaze to 
the near portion of the road in order to disambiguate road 
position signals normally picked up through peripheral 
vision (which has reduced acuity). On the other hand, the 
AVF group have road position signals augmented by an 
auditory beep so may not feel the need to redirect gaze to 
the near-road. Such vertical relocation of gaze behaviour 
lower in the scene can influence the steering trajectories 
(Mole et al., 2016) and may alter the nature of the task 
from a ‘steering-a-bend’ task (using visual preview) to a 
‘error nulling’ task. In order to keep the steering task 
similar to driving a vehicle, and avoid any possible gaze 
differences between groups, we controlled eye-
movements by spatially placing a red fixation cross 16m 
ahead of the driver in the centre of the road. Participants 
were asked to fixate on the cross, and were reminded 
during the experiment to continue fixating on the cross. 
This method has been used in a number of eye-tracking 
studies and participants are able to adequately fixate on the 
cross (e.g. Kountouriotis et al., 2012; Mole et al., 2016).    
 
 
Figure 1. A) Snapshot of the experimental stimulus showing the 
Narrow (0.3m) condition. A 3m road was always visible (white outline) 
but participants were instructed to stay within the target zone (green 
outline). Participants were asked to fixate on the red cross, which was 
placed 16m in front of the participant at the middle of the road. B) The 
post-trial judgement screen. Participants used the wheel to manipulate 
the slider and gear pads to record judgements and initiate the next trial.  
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At the end of each trial participants were presented with a 
sliding scale from 0-100% with the question “What 
percentage of time were you within the green zone?” 
(Figure 1B). Participants could manipulate the slider with 
the steering wheel and see what percentage they were 
selecting by an updating text label. Once the participant 
had reached a decision they could select the score by 
clicking the steering wheel gear-pads. To avoid any bias 
linked to using the wheel to determine the value, the 
steering wheel rotation was either translated directly onto 
the scale, or reversed (i.e. turning the wheel right would 
move the slider left). The mapping was randomised trial-
to-trial to avoid any biomechanical priming effects (e.g. on 
right bends the participant may have been more willing to 
make a higher percentage judgements as they are already 
turning the wheel in the direction of 100%) since motor 
movements are known to influence preferences (Beilock 
& Holt, 2007). Whilst it is possible that any priming effect 
would have been ‘washed out’ since half the bends were 
leftwards and half the bends were rightwards, an added 
reason for mirroring the wheel was to try to evoke 
carefully considered judgements. 
Procedure 
Participants were given five practice trials to ensure they 
knew what was required (to fixate the cross and steer 
within the target zone) and familiarise themselves with the 
experimental setup and steering wheel dynamics.  To 
avoid any confusion as to what constituted ‘”keeping in 
the zone” participants were asked to keep their midline 
within the zone. After each trial the participant would 
make a percentage judgement of total trial time spent 
within the target zone (see Figure 1B) then initiate the next 
trial. Participants were asked to return the wheel back to 
the centre immediately after recording a judgement to 
avoid starting the next trial with the steering wheel at a 
large angle. The participant was asked to fixate on the 
cross, and reminded to fixate once during the experiment. 
The experiment had two within subject factors 
(Speed and Width) and one between subjects factor (Level 
of Feedback). This resulted in four conditions per group, 
with each group completing 24 trials (six repetitions of 
each condition, 3 right bends and 3 left bends).  The order 
of trials was randomised for each participant with no more 
than three consecutive trials occurring of the same 
condition. Each trial lasted seven seconds (excluding the 
time taken for the participant to make their judgement, 
which was not limited), resulting in a minimum 
experiment running time of 2 minutes and 48 seconds.  
Analysis 
Road position was recorded frame-by-frame. The number 
of frames the participant spent outside the target zone was 
calculated, which was converted to a Percentage in Zone 
(PiZ) score to enable direct comparison against the 
participant judgements. Analysis included the whole trial 
because the participants’ judgements were similarly based 
on the whole trial. The second key measure was the 
participant’s post-trial Judgement of Performance (JoP): 
the percentage of total trial time the participant thought 
they had spent within the confines of the central target 
zone.  
We assessed the ability of participants to judge their 
performance through three metacognitive measures: 
sensitivity, calibration, and resolution. First we 
determined whether judgements were sensitive to 
changing parameters of the task by examining whether JoP 
scores vary according to level of feedback and task 
difficulty (metacognitive sensitivity). We then compare 
JoPs directly to PiZ scores by taking the signed and 
absolute difference scores (signed & absolute accuracy), 
to assess the extent that judgements were calibrated to 
performance (metacognitive calibration).  However, in 
this experiment competent monitoring of perceptual-
motor actions may not require that the participant’s 
internal judgement scale is perfectly matched with the 
external performance scale i.e. participants do not need to 
be able to precisely calculate how many frames of each 
trial they spent within the zone as long as their judgements 
reliably track fluctuations in performance. Indeed, a 
hesitant individual could have a propensity to consistently 
underestimate performance therefore score badly on 
metacognitive calibration measures, but their judgements 
may perfectly capture subtle changes in task performance 
therefore showing excellent resolution.  Therefore, we 
also calculate metacognitive resolution by using Pearson’s 
R (Schraw, 1995) to compute intra-individual correlations 
between JoP and PiZ. All measures were subject to a 2 
(Speed) x 2 (Width) x 2 (Level of Feedback) ANOVA 
using R. 
Results  
Performance (PiZ) 
Participants attempted to steer within the target zone, and 
task performance was measured using the percentage of 
time within the zone. Table 1 displays the mixed model 
ANOVA results: there were main effects of Zone Width, 
Speed, and Feedback. There were also significant 
interactions between Width x Speed and Width x Speed x 
Feedback (Figure 2A). As expected, for both feedback 
groups participants kept within the target zone for a longer 
proportion of time on wider and slower trials, with the 
additional feedback increasing the amount of time spent in 
the zone. The interactions occurred because additional 
auditory feedback led to a greater improvement between 
widths when travelling at fast speeds compared to slow 
speeds (shown by a steeper slope for the dashed line with 
black symbols compared to the solid line with black 
symbols in Figure 2A). Though group performance did not 
reach 100% for any conditions, performance in the Wide-
Slow (AVF) condition was >90% so ceiling effects in 
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some individuals may have artificially reduced the effect 
of width.  
 
Figure 2. Average PiZ (A) and JoP (B) scores for participants with 
visual feedback only (empty symbols) or additional auditory feedback 
(black symbols) at fast speeds (dashed lines) or slow speeds (solid 
lines) with Narrow or Wide zones. Bars represent standard error of the 
mean. 
Metacognitive Sensitivity (JoP) 
The steering performance measures showed that task 
conditions altered the ability of participants to stay in zone. 
At first pass we wished to see whether JoPs were sensitive 
to changes in task difficulty and provision of additional 
feedback. The results of the mixed model ANOVA are 
displayed in Table 1. There were main effects of Speed 
and Zone Width, indicating some sensitivity to these 
conditions 
Interestingly, there was not a main effect of 
Feedback indicating that there was not a consistent shift in 
JoP scores when auditory feedback was available. There 
were, however, significant interactions between Width x 
Feedback, Speed x Feedback, and Width x Speed (shown 
in Figure 2B). The interactions showed that: auditory 
feedback had a greater effect on JoPs when the zone was 
wide; Speed had a weaker effect for the AVF group; and 
for both groups, the magnitude of JoPs increased more 
between widths when travelling at fast speeds compared 
to slow speeds.
 
Table 1. The effect of zone width, locomotor speed and levels of feedback on PiZ and JoP scores. Produced by mixed design 2 (Speed) x 2 (Width) x 2 
(Level of Feedback) ANOVAs, with Eta squared effect sizes reported. Degrees of freedom was 1, 62 throughout. 
 Performance (PiZ)  Judgements (JoP) 
 F η2 P  F η2 P 
Width 438.12 .26 <.001*  63.49 .079 <.001* 
Speed 171.21 .19 <.001*  92.58 .14 <.001* 
FeedbackF 5.8 .07 .019*  2.41 .029 .125 
Width x Feedback .08 <.001 .78  9.64 .013 .003* 
Speed x Feedback .25 <.001 .62  7.85 .014 .007* 
Width x Speed 5.22 .004 .026*  6.21 .003 .015* 
Width x Speed x 
Feedback 
4.45 .003 .039*  .089 <.001 .767 
FLevel of Feedback was the only between-subjects factor 
*p<.05 
.  
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Metacognitive Calibration (Signed & 
Absolute Accuracy) 
In order to assess Metacognitive Calibration we directly 
compared JoP scores with PiZ scores. Whilst  signed 
accuracy (Figure 3A) gives a useful indication of the 
overall tendency to over/under estimate, if judgments are 
inconsistent and include both over/under estimations then 
this could average to near zero and fail to capture the 
variability. In contrast, absolute accuracy (Figure 3B) 
gives an indication of total precision error, regardless of 
error direction. We therefore calculated both Signed and 
Absolute Accuracy measures across each condition. 
The results of the ANOVA are displayed in Table 
2. For Signed Accuracy (Figure 3A), there was a 
significant main effect of Zone Width, but not a main 
effect of Speed or Feedback. There was, however, 
significant Width x Feedback and Speed x Feedback 
interactions (it is worth noting, however, that the effect 
sizes for both the main effect of Width and the two 
interactions are small). As shown in Figure 3A, in VF 
conditions there was a large tendency to underestimate in 
Wide compared to Narrow conditions (where 
underestimation was reduced or eliminated). In contrast, 
for the AVF group both Narrow and Wide conditions 
produced a tendency to underestimate (the Width x 
Feedback interaction). The Speed x Feedback interaction 
occurs because Fast speeds produced greater 
underestimating behaviour in VF, but the effect was 
reversed in AVF (Slow speeds produced greater 
underestimating behaviour).  
For Absolute Accuracy (Figure 3B), the ANOVA 
revealed only a marginally significant main effect of 
Width, with a small effect size (Table 2). This was due to 
JoPs having greater accuracy on Wide Zones compared to 
Narrow Zones (Figure 3B). As can be seen in Figure 3B, 
this effect was mostly due to increased accuracy for the 
Wide Zones during AVF.  
The magnitudes for signed accuracy (Figure 3A) are less 
than absolute accuracy (Figure 3B), showing that the 
tendency to under/over estimate was not completely 
consistent across participants (identical magnitudes would 
indicate that the direction of under/over estimation was the 
same for every participant). Taking both accuracy 
measures together, it seems that although the average 
tendency to over/under estimate varied between 
conditions (Figure 3A), the relative over/under estimation 
precision error was fairly consistent and also large (around 
20 percentage points; Figure 3B) – suggesting that 
participants were poorly calibrated. 
 
 
Figure 3. Metacognitive Calibration, captured by the (A) Signed, and (B) Absolute trial-by-trial differences between judgement and performance scores. In 
A) positive scores indicate overconfidence. VF= Visual feedback only; AVF= Auditory and Visual feedback. Error bars represent standard error of the 
mean.  
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Table 2. The effect of zone width, locomotor speed and levels of feedback on Metacognitive Calibration and Metacognitive Resolution. Produced by 
mixed design 2 (Speed) x 2 (Width) x 2 (Level of Feedback) ANOVAs, with Eta squared effect sizes reported. Degrees of freedom was (1, 62) throughout. 
 
Calibration: Signed 
Accuracy 
 
Calibration: Absolute 
Accuracy 
 Resolution (Pearson’s R) 
 F η2 P  F η2 p  F η2 p 
Zone Width 26.07 .036 <.001*  4.07 .01 .048*  .7 .002 .41 
Speed .032 <.001 .86  <.001 <.001 .99  6.92 .026 .011* 
FeedbackF .24 .003 .63  1.19 .013 .28  .14 .001 .71 
Width x Feedback 9.79 .014 .003*  3.45 .008 .07  .009 <.001 .93 
Speed x Feedback 6.64 .01 .012*  .11 <.001 .74  3.17 .012 .08 
Width x Speed .085 <.001 .77  1.32 .001 .25  1.01 .003 .31 
Width x Speed x 
Feedback 
3.71 .003 .058  1.76 .002 .19  3.31 .009 .074 
FLevel of Feedback was the only between-subjects factor 
*p<.05.  
Metacognitive Resolution (Pearson’s R) 
The calibration measures suggest that participants were 
unable to closely match judgements to performance. 
However, this does not necessarily capture whether 
participants were sensitive to changes in performance (i.e. 
metacognitive resolution). Pearson’s R values were 
computed across PiZ and JoP scores for each individual 
within each group for each condition. The resulting R 
values indicate the extent to which individual judgements 
reflected the performance in those conditions, and provide 
a measure of relative accuracy.  The pattern across 
conditions/groups was analysed using a 2 (Speed) x 2 
(Width) x 2 (Level of Feedback) ANOVA (see Table 2) 
which revealed a main effect of Speed (with a small effect 
size), but not a main effect of Width or Feedback, nor any 
interactions. The main effect of speed was due to 
significantly higher metacognitive resolution when 
travelling faster at 18m/s (grand mean = .5) compared to 
travelling slower at 12m/s (grand mean=.36; Figure 4). 
Whilst in some conditions there were isolated differences 
in resolution between levels of feedback (e.g. for Slow-
Narrow providing auditory feedback increased resolution 
from 25% to 47%), the results of the ANOVA demonstrate 
that these differences did not reach significance.  
 
Figure 4. Metacognitive Resolution for each condition and each level 
of feedback (VF= Visual feedback only; AVF= Auditory and Visual 
feedback). Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
Investigating Metacognitive Mechanisms 
One aim of the study was to examine whether task-related 
cues were used to generate metacognitive judgements. The 
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metacognitive measures of calibration and resolution 
demonstrate that participants’ judgements seem to be 
poorly calibrated (and mostly characterised by under-
estimation of time in zone), with only limited resolution. 
The question remains how individuals were generating 
their judgements. Participants could have been attempting 
to directly monitor steering performance based on the 
measure of interest (PiZ), and that for some reason 
participants were simply unable to determine when their 
midline moved in or out of the zone (see Discussion for a 
consideration of some possible methodological reasons for 
this). On other hand, it could be that in attempting to gauge 
performance, participants’ were (consciously or 
unconsciously) using task-relevant cues as heuristics, such 
as speed of travel or lane width (e.g. Koriat, 2008). Such a 
strategy could lead to both poor calibration and resolution 
if participants do not weight the cues appropriately.  
 In order to examine this issue further we carried 
out a trial-level regression analysis, following a method 
proposed by Lorch and Myers (1990; see also Allen & 
Hulme, 2006; Metcalfe et al., 2013). Within this analysis, 
each participant’s JoPs were submitted to a separate 
within-subjects regression analysis in which Performance 
(PiZ for that trial), Speed and Zone Width (represented by 
binary flags: 1 = Slow, 0 = Fast; 1 = Wide, 0 = Narrow) 
were entered together as predictors. The resulting beta 
values for each predictor were then analysed using a one-
sample t-test to examine whether they were significantly 
different from 0. This allowed us to establish whether each 
predictor contributed to JoPs, whilst controlling for inter-
participant variability. Results for the three predictors of 
interest for both Feedback groups are presented in Table 
3.  
The regression analysis demonstrates that actual 
task performance and task-relevant cues each contributed 
to determining judgements of performance (Table 3). For 
VF conditions, participant judgements were determined 
mostly by performance, and to a lesser extent a Speed 
heuristic that altered judgements when trials were fast or 
slow (JoPs increased when speed slowed). Whilst the beta 
value for a Zone Width heuristic indicates that JoP scores, 
on average, actually decreased when the zone became 
wider (after taking into account task Performance and a 
Speed heuristic), this trend was variable between 
participants (shown by a large beta standard error) so was 
not significant (Table 3).  When auditory feedback was 
added (AVF), judgements were similarly determined 
mostly by performance, but the heuristics used to 
influence judgements were based upon both Speed and 
Zone Width. Although the beta value magnitudes of both 
cues are less than those of VF, a Zone Width heuristic 
(higher JoPs for wider zones) appears to consistently 
contribute to JoPs across participants. Speed cues appear 
to have a diminished role in AVF (compared to VF) but 
still contributes significantly to judgements. 
The predictive weight of actual task performance 
remained fairly consistent across feedback conditions - 
this is in line with the results for Metacognitive 
Resolution, which did not reveal significant differences 
between feedback conditions when predicting judgments 
using PiZ scores only (see Figure 4) 
 
 
Table 3. Mean betas for each variable included in the within-subjects regression analyses predicting JoP by Feedback group. Results of the one-sample t-
tests evaluating whether the mean beta values were significantly different from 0 are also reported. For Width and Speed, positive beta values indicate that 
JoP scores increased as the task became slower or the zone became wider. 
Feedback Predictor β SE β t df P 
VF Zone Width -.209 .134 -1.56 31 .129 
 Speed .264 .040 6.65 31 <.001* 
 Performance .504 .052 9.68 31 <.001* 
AVF Zone Width .107 .038 2.77 31 .009* 
 Speed .074 .032 2.35 31 .025* 
 Performance .528 .075 7.08 31 <.001* 
*p<.05.  
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Discussion 
This study examined the extent to which participants were 
sensitive to changes in steering performance across 
conditions of varying difficulty. Whilst participant 
judgements did broadly reflect changes in performance, 
they were not particularly well-calibrated, and appear to 
be fairly coarse estimates that were partially based on 
salient task properties (e.g. fast vs. slow travel speeds). 
The key finding was that judgements of performance on a 
perceptual-motor task were generated using two 
interacting processes: i) explicit monitoring of 
performance, and ii) estimation of performance based on 
task heuristics (i.e. speed of travel or width of zone), the 
weighting of which was influenced by quality of feedback.  
Participants were asked to steer within the 
confines of a central target zone and then make a 
retrospective judgement on their performance. Altering 
task parameters (Speed and Zone Width) and feedback 
availability produced systematic changes in task 
performance: faster and narrower conditions proved more 
difficult to steer than slower and wider conditions, and 
auditory feedback produced better steering performance in 
all conditions. The ability to incorporate auditory feedback 
into what is predominantly a visually guided action (e.g. 
Robertshaw & Wilkie, 2008; Wilkie, Kountouriotis, 
Merat, & Wann, 2010) highlights the robust nature of the 
sensorimotor system to use a flexible weighted 
combination of available cues (Ernst & Banks, 2002; 
Wilkie & Wann, 2002). 
When examining how well judgements reflected 
these changes in performance we calculated three 
measures of success: sensitivity, calibration and 
resolution. Judgements appeared broadly sensitive to 
performance variations, estimating better performance for 
slower and wider trials, and when auditory feedback was 
present. This level of sensitivity fits well with evidence 
that people are somewhat sensitive (at least at a coarse 
level) to how changes in task parameters affect task 
difficulty (e.g. Roberts et al., 2016). However, judgements 
showed limited calibration when directly compared to trial 
performance, in most conditions consistently 
underestimating performance. This underestimation 
would seem to contradict the general observation across 
the driving literature of over-confidence in judgements of 
driving skill (Svenson, 1981; Goszcynska & Roslan, 
1989). In the extant literature judgements are typically 
made with reference to an ‘average’ driver, rather than 
specifically to the actual performance on the task (as is the 
case here; see also Roberts et al., 2016). Here we have 
shown that self-judgements on a specific steering task can 
lead to performance underestimations rather than 
overestimations. However, previous research suggests 
that, when making motor planning decisions, people tend 
to overestimate motor precision (Mamassian, 2008). 
Similar overconfidence during our task would most likely 
produce inflated estimates of performance (since low 
steering variability would have led to increased time 
within the zone). One possible cause for this mismatch is 
that there is a disconnect between motor decision making 
and self-report (i.e. they have different informational 
inputs), with the self-report underestimation being due to 
biased monitoring – for example isolated steering errors 
would have a small effect upon the actual PiZ score (since 
performance was calculated across the whole trial) 
whereas these errors may have been particularly salient to 
participants and thus they overestimated their impact upon 
PiZ. The degree to which cognitively penetrable self-
report influences trajectory planning decisions is an 
important avenue for future research. 
In the current study, the level of calibration was 
not the primary focus, since a participant may show poor 
calibration (e.g. due to response bias) whilst 
simultaneously perfectly adjusting judgement scores 
according to changes in performance across trials. 
However, values reported for monitoring resolution were 
fairly low (the grand mean R2 for Monitoring Resolution 
was only .2), suggesting that in the steering task the 
driver’s ability to pick up subtle fluctuations in 
performance was limited. It is possible that weak 
judgements were linked to methodological characteristics. 
For example, participants may not have been able to 
determine precisely where the ‘midline’ of the vehicle was 
(although whilst this may explain poor calibration, it does 
not explain limited resolution). It is also worth noting that 
there was no sign of fatigue or reduced engagement 
throughout the short experiment (when making 
judgements participants carefully selected their responses 
and took approximately 3.2s (SE=.12s) to do so).  
It seems likely that the low monitoring resolution 
is symptomatic of the difficulties humans have trying to 
consciously monitor unfolding perceptual-motor events. 
This explanation is grounded in the literature that suggests 
that only some aspects of perceptual-motor behaviour may 
be cognitively penetrable (Prablanc & Martin, 1992; 
Pelisson et al., 1986; Pisella et al., 2000; Fourneret & 
Jeannerod, 1998; Sinanaj et al., 2015). Furthermore, the 
relatively poor monitoring performance shown here may 
well indicate that reports of well-calibrated driver self-
assessments using fairly coarse measures (Sundstrom, 
2011; Roberts et al., 2016) will have limited applicability 
to monitoring a precise perceptual-motor task during 
execution.  
It is perhaps surprising that the group with 
auditory feedback did not have greater metacognitive 
resolution since this signal provided an explicit mark each 
time the driver entered or exited the zone. It does, 
however, echo Roberts et al., (2016) finding that feedback 
about driver performance does not clearly improve driver 
calibration. Roberts et al. (2016) suggested that in their 
study the delay between performance and feedback may 
have decreased the impact of feedback provision, but we 
have replicated this finding (at least with respect to 
monitoring resolution) when feedback is provided 
immediately in response to performance on the perceptual-
motor task.  
A major finding within the current study is that 
drivers may supplement limited performance monitoring 
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by using heuristic cue-based estimation. On a trial-by-trial 
regression analysis, we found that binary predictors of task 
characteristics significantly contributed to determining 
JoPs alongside actual performance scores (the exception 
being Zone Width in the VF condition). A cue-based 
approach to making self-assessments of driver 
performance has been recently proposed (Horrey et al., 
2015), but we believe our findings support a potential 
generative mechanism of judgments of perceptual-motor 
performance that comprises two contributing processes: 
(i) explicitly monitoring actual performance and (ii) 
estimating performance based on task-relevant cues. 
These processes will be discussed in turn:  
Explicitly monitoring actual performance  
The regression analysis showed that task performance 
scores provided a (dominant) contribution to predicting 
JoPs, meaning that participants at some level monitor 
perceptual-motor performance related to steering 
behaviour and discriminate between this and the 
perceptual information relating to task parameters (i.e. 
Speed of travel and Width of Zone, which provided a 
smaller contribution to predicting JoPs). It remains unclear 
at what stage within the perceptual-motor system (i.e. 
motor planning, execution, or feedback) the monitoring 
process takes place. Fleming et al. (2015) identified a 
potential contribution (when making confidence 
judgements on a perceptual discrimination task) for 
premotor areas associated with motor planning but not 
areas associated with motor execution. This suggests that 
at least some of the contribution of PiZ to JoPs may be 
explained by motor planning (e.g. steering corrections). 
Additionally, it is possible that the monitoring limitations 
observed in our data may be at least partly due to 
perceptual limitations in detecting deviations of the 
midline relative to the target zone, rather than limitations 
in metacognitive monitoring ability per se (these two 
processes appear to have distinct associated brain areas, 
Sinanaj et al., 2015). It is worth noting, however, that 
Performance weighting changed little between feedback 
groups, suggesting that the ‘monitoring of performance’ 
aspect of judgement generation may occur before 
feedback is available (i.e. during planning or execution). 
This is a valuable avenue to explore for further research.  
Estimating performance based on task-relevant 
cues 
The second contribution to JoPs were from estimations 
based on task heuristics.  The regression analysis 
suggested that cue-based estimation may be a secondary 
process, as binary predictors of changes in task parameters 
constituted a smaller contribution than task performance 
(PiZ scores). Constructing judgments from task-relevant 
cues has been a principle framework for metacognition 
(Koriat, 2000; Koriat, 2008), and weighted cue-based 
estimation has been proposed as a useful framework with 
which to understand driver self-assessments (Horrey et al., 
2015). Our evidence of a cue-based metacognitive 
mechanism both validates Horrey et al.’s proposals, and 
the use of metacognitive principles for assessing 
awareness of perceptual-motor performance.  
When participants received only visual feedback 
the cue-based estimation process appears to be driven by 
speed cues, rather than zone width cues. This agrees with 
recent findings that humans are sensitive to global flow 
speed when steering bends, even when flow speed 
information per se is not critical to the task at hand (e.g. 
maintaining position in lane; Kountouriotis, Mole, Merat 
& Wilkie, 2016), and leads to the intriguing possibility that 
the observed flow induced steering biases in Kountouriotis 
et al. (2016) could at least partly be due to metacognitive 
influences over steering control.  
Whilst cue-based estimation may be an efficient 
heuristic, it relies on appropriate weightings that are 
learned over time. Initial cue weightings will be 
determined by prior experience, but the effective use of 
cue-based estimation needs prior cue-weights to be 
updated using feedback. The group receiving auditory 
feedback had different weightings attributed to each 
heuristic – suggesting feedback can be used to update cue 
weights - but this did not lead to increased monitoring 
resolution (in this particular task). The process 
determining how cue weightings (and cue-selection) are 
learned is an important open question that is of relevance 
to any situation where decisions are made based upon 
perceptual-motor performance. 
 
Conclusions 
The current manuscript presents an attempt to bring 
together cross-cutting themes in perception, action and 
cognition – combining perspectives from metacognition, 
vision science and traffic psychology to assess 
metacognitive awareness of perceptual-motor 
performance. Our results provide initial evidence that 
judgements are generally poor, but that the signals used to 
form judgements may vary depending on the task 
conditions. Suggestions of a dual-process account of 
judgment generation have been presented, consisting of: i) 
monitoring of perceptual-motor performance (Fleming et 
al., 2015; Sinanaj et al., 2015), and ii) weighted cue-based 
estimation (Koriat, 2000; Koriat, 2008; Horrey et al., 
2015). Our results suggest that drivers may be making 
strategic decisions about trajectory planning based on 
fairly flawed estimates of actual steering performance. 
The question remains how to improve these estimates to 
help drivers gauge their own perceptual-motor 
capabilities. Whilst it seems likely that providing some 
form of additional feedback about errors could improve 
performance, our evidence does not suggest that this will 
necessarily allow drivers to better evaluate this 
performance. The task in the current manuscript is 
specific, and it is imperative that this model is tested in 
other perceptual-motor scenarios, under different 
monitoring constraints. Future research should also 
consider how these monitoring processes interact with 
non-perceptual priors not examined in the current 
manuscript – such as level of driver experience, or 
perceived competency. 
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